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MANSLAUGHTER: ADEQUACY OF PROVOCATION IN MISSOURI
The present Missouri requirements of adequate provocation necessary to
reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter need reconsideration. The result in
the Brookshire case is a cogent example of this need.
State v. BrookshireL

Defendant's version of the facts, 2 briefly stated, are as follows. Defendant and
deceased engaged in an argument and deceased threatened to kill defendant with
a knife. Defendant became worried and obtained a gun. Later, another argument
developed and deceased began chasing defendant. As deceased was gaining ground
defendant whirled and shot, killing deceased. A large black-handled knife was
found beside the body of deceased.
Defendant was tried on first degree murder. The trial court instructed the
jury on the degrees of murder, on self-defense and on defense of home. However,
following a long line of Missouri decisions3 the court refused to instruct on manslaughter. Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced
to ten years in the penitentiary. One of the grounds for his appeal was the refusal
of the court to give a manslaughter instruction.
The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's refusal because the
evidence failed to disclose personal violence, i.e., a battery, to defendant. For this
reason it was held there was not adequate provocation to reduce the killing to
manslaughter.
I.

THE MISSOURi BATTERY TEST

The Missouri requirement of a battery for adequate provocation was stated
as long ago as 1866 in the leading case of State v. Starr.4 The trial court found
no evidence of personal violence and the supreme court found, no error in the
refusal to instruct on manslaughter, saying,
Where there is lawful provocation, the law, out of indulgence to human
frailty, will reduce the killing from the crime of murder to manslaughter;
but neither words of reproach, how grievous soever, nor indecent provoking
actions or gestures, however much calculated to excite indignation or
arouse the passions, are sufficient to free the party killing from the guilt
of murder. To have the effect to reduce the guilt of killing to the lower
grade, the provocation must consist of personal violence .

. .

. There

must be an assault upon the person, as where the provocation was by
1. 368 S.W.2d 373 (Mo. 1963).
2. The state presented substantial evidence conflicting with defendant's story
and the jury may have correctly disregarded his account. Nevertheless, an instruction
on manslaughter may be based solely on defendant's testimony. For Missouri
cases on this point see State v. Brookshire, supra note 1, at 384.
3. State v. Brookshire, supra note 1, and cases cited therein; State v. Haynes,
329 S.W.2d 640 (Mo. 1959), and cases cited therein; State v. Bongard, 330 Mo.
805, 51 S.W.2d 84 (1932), and cases cited therein.
4. 38 Mo. 270 (1866).
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pulling the nose, purposely jostling the slayer aside in the highway or
other direct and actual battery. .

.

The personal violence or battery test for adequate provocation has persisted
in Missouri down to the present day. There have been exceptions, notably State
v. Brown7 and State v. Garrison," wherein apprehension of apparent, imminent
danger has been held to be sufficient provocation. These cases, unfortunately, have
long been overruled.9
The battery requirement can become somewhat absurd in certain fact situations.'o State v. Wright" is such a case. The defendant shot deceased who, after
making suggestive advances towards her, began unzipping his trousers. The
court found a technical touching when deceased placed his arm around defendant.
However, the court went on to say that a close male relative of defendant would
be entitled to a manslaughter instruction if he killed deceased upon encountering
his female kin in such circumstances. Therefore, since defendant should be in no
less position than her brother or father she deserved a manslaughter instruction.
The irrationality of the battery test occurred to the supreme court in State v.
Bongard.j2 But after attaining recognition the problem was summarily set aside.
The court found no error in the refusal of an instruction on manslaughter where
deceased had threatened defendant with a knife thereby placing .defendant in fear
of imminent danger. The court stated:
It may seem illogical to say the insulting but comparatively harmless
jostling of a person on the highway, or a mere tweaking of the nose, may
be sufficient to constitute lawful provocation, whereas a hostile demonstration with a deadly weapon threatening imminent danger to life will
not, though accompanied by vile and insulting language. But the law cannot have a rule exactly accommodating itself to the varied dispositions
of people and altogether putting a premium on turbulent tendencies.'s
The time has come when Missouri should again recognize, but this time remedy, the inadequacy and unfairness of its present law on provocation. The awkwardness in reaching the correct result in the Wright case is not necessary. Rather,
5. Id. at 277.
6. See cases cited supra note 3.
7. 64 Mo. 367 (1877).
8. 147 Mo. 548, 49 S.W. 508 (1898).
9. State v. Brown was expressly overruled by State v. Bongard, supra note
3; State v. Garrison was overruled by the holding of State v. Biswell, 352 Mo. 698,
179 S.W.2d 61 (1944).
10. State v. Haynes, supra note 3. Defendant testified that deceased pointed
a gun at her and pulled the trigger twice, only to have the gun misfire. Defendant
knocked the gun away, picked it up and shot deceased. The supreme court, relying
on State v. Bongard, supra note 3, held that a manslaughter instruction was not
called for since there was no personal violence to the defendant. At the other
extreme is State v. Creighton, 330 Mo. 1176, 52 S.W.2d 556 (1932), where the
supreme court reversed for failure to instruct on manslaughter when the evidence
showed deceased had brushed against defendant, taking hold of his coat.
11. 336 S.W.2d 714 (Mo. 1960).
12. S-upra note 3.

13. Id. at 816, 51 S.W.2d at 89.
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it is hoped that Missouri will recognize that apprehension of apparent, imminent,
substantial bodily injury is sufficient provocation to reduce a homicide from murder
to manslaughter.
II. THE NEED FoR CHANGE
The shortcomings of the battery requirement are made manifest by the distinction between manslaughter and murder. Manslaughter has been the subject of
various ill-suited definitions.14 But it is generally agreed that manslaughter is dif-

ferentiated from murder by the absence of malice.15 This distinction is pointed
out by the Missouri court in State v.Smart6 wherein manslaughter is concisely
defined as "the killing of another intentionally, but in a sudden heat of passion
due to adequate provocation and without malice."17
Mindful of this element distinguishing the two crimes, it becomes apparent
that fear or apprehension of substantial bodily harm should certainly be as effective in eliminating malice as is the heat of passion arising from a sudden
battery.18 Indeed, Missouri has correctly recognized fear or terror as an emotion
included in the phrase "heat of passion. '19
However, in many cases where defendant acted from fear or terror of suffering substantial bodily harm there has been no battery 20 In fact, one of the most
obvious situations giving rise to fear is an apparent assault with a deadly weapon
as in the Brookshire21 and Haynes2 cases. Clearly, such circumstances could
frighten the average just and reasonable man and render his mind "incapable of
reflection." If so, then by definition, 23 the victim of the assault would be
incapable of malice and the subsequent killing should be reduced to manslaughter.
In situations where defendant has killed after being assaulted with a deadly
. 14. Cf. § 559.070, RSMo 1959. For a critical examination of the Missouri
statutes see Hunvald, Criminal Law in Missouri-Manslaughter,A Problem of
Definition, 27 Mo. 'L. REv. 1, 2 (1962).
15. Hunvald, supra note 14. This is an excellent discussion of the difficult term
"malice."
16. 328 S.W.2d 569 (Mo. 1959).
17. Id. at 574.
18. See excellent reasoning in MORELAND, THE LAw OF HoMICIDE, 77 (1952).

19. State v. Smart,supra note 17, at 574, and cases cited therein. The court
relied on WHARTON, HoMicIDE, § 172 (3d ed. 1907):

A provocation is deemed to be adequate, so as to reduce the offense from
murder to manslaughter, whenever it is calculated to excite the passion

beyond control. Itmust be of such a character as would, in the mind of
an average just and reasonable man, stir resentment likely to cause violence endangering life, or as would naturally tend to disturb and obscure
the reason and lead to action from passion rather than judgment, or to
create anger, rage, sudden resentment or terror rendering the mind incapable of reflection. (Emphasis added.)
20. For a general discussion, see Comment, Manslaughter and the Adequacy
of Provocation: The Reasonableness of the Reasonable Man, 106 U. PA. L. REv.
1021, 1024-28 (1958).
21. State v.Brookshire, supra note 1.
22. The facts of this case are set out in note 10, supra.
23. WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 19.
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24
weapon the United States Supreme Court and the courts of many of our sister
25
states would require an instruction on manslaughter.
This same approach has seemingly been adopted by the American Law
Institute in its Proposed Official Draft of the Model Pend Code. Section 210.3
states:

Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when: . . .
(b) a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which
there is reasonable explanation or excutse. The reasonableness of such
explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a
person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes
them to be. (Emphasis added.)
In the Comment to this section the authors declare:
We thus treat on a parity with provocation cases in the classic sense,
situations where the provocative circumstance is something other than an
in6sry inflicted by the deceased on the actor but nonetheless is an event
2
calculated to arouse extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 3 (Emphasis added.)
In Missouri, if there has been no battery, the defendant who kills out of fear
caused by an assault with a deadly weapon must rely solely on the defense of
justifiable or excusable homicide-self-defense. The Missouri Supreme Court took
this position in State v. Bongard, stating:
Where the defendant believes and has reasonable ground for belief that
an impending assault imminently threatens his life or great bodily harm,
he can act in self-defense and be completely exculpated though there be
no battery. Juries can be depended upon to deal with the particular2 7 facts
as justice demands. It is hard to improve on the common law rule.
The plea of self-defense may provide for the person who is completely
free of any responsibility for the affray and who had reasonable ground to
believe that at the time he killed the deceased he was in imminent danger of his
life or great bodily injury. But what of defendants who may carry some culpability? For instance, what about the person who was unreasonable in his belief that his life was imminently threatened,2 or who was menaced only with
substantial bodily harm,2 9 yet who nevertheless took the life of his assailant?
If the apprehension of danger was sufficient to exclude the possibility of malice
24. Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313 (1896).
25. See particularly Commonwealth v. Colandro, 231 Pa. 343, 80 Atl. 571
(1911). See also Davis v. State, 214 Ala. 273, 107 So. 737 (1926); Swain v. State,
151 Ga. 375, 107 S.E. 40 (1921); Beasley v. State, 64 Miss. 518, 8 So. 234 (1886);
State v. Simpson, 39 N.M. 271, 46 P.2d 49 (1935).
26. MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.3, comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
27. State v. Bongard, supra note 3 at 816, 51 S.W.2d at 89. It is strange that
while battery is necessary to mitigate homicide, such is not required to completely
excuse.
28. WHARTON, op. cit. sunpra note 19, § 194.
29. MORELAND, Op. cit. supra note 18, at 77.
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can there be a just conviction of murder? Clearly not. But a murder conviction
may very well be the result if a battery is required in addition to fear of danger.
The battery test precludes the Missouri jury from considering all the evidence necessary to reach a just determination. For instance, the evidence may
show that the homicide was committed under mitigating circumstances. Yet, if
the killing was wrongful and the jury does not want to release the defendant
back into society it has little choice but to convict of murder without even considering the mitigating evidence pointing to manslaughter.
It is the defendant who has been wronged for he has been convicted of murder.
This crime carries the most severe penalty in the law and should be reserved for
the cold-blooded homicide where no evidence of mitigation exists. When defendant
has killed in hot blood under the influence of emotional confusion an instruction
on the lesser crime of manslaughter is essential to a fair result.
Commonwealtk v. Colandro3° directly embraces this contention. Defendant
shot and killed deceased who had placed defendant in imminent peril. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in reversing a murder conviction for failure to instruct on manslaughter, said,
While the evidence might not have been sufficient to satisfy the
jury that the plea of self-defense had been sustained, it might have appealed to them as sufficient to negative or to throw such doubt upon the
element of malice as to reduce the crime to manslaughter . . . . The
dividing line between self-defense and this character of manslaughter
seems to be the existence, as the moving force, of a reasonably founded
belief of imminent 'peril to life or great bodily harm, as distinguished
from the influence of an uncontrollable fear or terror, conceivable as
existing, but not reasonably justified by the immediate circumstances. If
the circumstances are both adequate to raise and sufficient to justify a

belief in the necessity to take life in order to save oneself from such a
danger, where the belief exists and is acted upon, the homicide is excusable upon the theory of self-defense . . . ; while, if the act is com-

mitted under the influence of an uncontrollable fear of death or great
bodily harm, caused by the circumstances, but without the presence of
all the ingredients necessary to excuse the act on the ground of selfdefense, the killing is manslaughter ....

3

The facts in State v. Brooksire3 fall well within the language of the Pennsylvania court. After much boasting by deceased of his infamous accomplishments
with a knife, defendant armed himself before returning to see if deceased
was still downstairs. When deceased turned and reaching for his hip pocket
threatened, "I am going to finish you off," defendant fled in fear of his
life. Defendant testified that he did not actually see deceased with a knife during the chase. Thus, his original apprehension may have been unreasonable. Yet,
the evidence indicates that he fled in fear just the same. Fear, it is suggested,
which rendered his mind incapable of clear thought. But because there was no
30. Supra note 25.
31. Supra note 25, at 352, 80 Atl. at 574.
32. Supra note 1.
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